Wunderwaffe Und Politikwissenschaft

Wonder Weapon And Political Science

Andrei Martyanov addresses important data points, to include Ukraine million man army, Russian Poseidon torpedo and launching submarine, net-centric warfare, and political science.

On his blog today, Andrei elaborates:

As I already stated not for once: Pentagon and CIA planners of VSU "offensive" which was to start in early March and was forestalled by Russia launching SMO on 24 February, have miscalculated, again. It is one thing to plan operations against Taliban or Saddam's Army, totally another to plan something against Russian Armed Forces and especially based on ignorance of Russia's military-industrial capability. As I already quoted my good media buddy Colonel Trukhan:"They (Pentagon) are not going to out-think us". Rings especially true on the anniversary of a cataclysmic clash of Soviet and Wehrmacht's armor at Prokhorovka during Kursk Battle in July of 1943. 

Anyone among those "planners" even bothered to look at the scale and scope of that battle? While one may legitimately challenge History's Channel's numbers, traditionally under-reported for German side, the forces that clashed at Kursk were (per Glantz and House, page 217) 1,337,166 (among them 977,219 combat troops) for the Red Army and 777,000 for Wehrmacht, Red Army tanks: 3,400. Wehrmacht: 2,451. Artillery* for the Red Army: 19,794, Wehrmacht: 8,170. Combat aircraft for Red AF: 2,650, Luftwaffe: 2,500. This mass of troops and equipment clashed on July 5 and it all resulted on July 12, 1943 in a cataclysmic event at Prokhorovka. So, the question is: what strategic and operational experience US and UK planners have to face in a form of Russia's General Staff? Right. The answer is obvious. And that is the primer for today.

*Note the differential in artillery, well over 2:1 favoring the Red Army. Russians believe in pounding an enemy before engaging him. Bhima’s weapon was a hammer. It works.

Swami Vivekananda Memorial, Mandapam, Kanyakumari, Tamil Nadu, India